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The biopsychosocial model and its potential 
for a new theory of homeopathy * 
Josef M Schmidt* 
Institute of Ethics, History, and Theory of Medicine, University of Munich, Germany 
Since the nineteenth century the theory of conventional medicine has been developed in 
close alignment with the mechanistic paradigm of natural sciences. Only in the twenti-
eth century occasional attempts were made to (re)introduce the 'subject' into medical 
theory, as byThure von Uexküll (1908-2004) who elaborated the so-called biopsychoso-
cial model ofthe human being, trying to understand the patient as a unit of organic, men-
tal, and social dimensions of life. Although widely neglected by conventional medicine, it 
is one of the most coherent, significant, and up-to-date models of medicine at present. 
Being torn between strict adherence to Hahnemann's original conceptualization and 
alienation caused by contemporary scientific criticism, homeopathy today still Iacks 
a generally accepted, consistent, and definitive theory which would explain in scientific 
terms its strength, peculiarity, and principles without relapsing into biomedical reduc-
tionism. The biopsychosocial model of the human being implies great potential for 
a new theory of homeopathy, as may be demonstrated with some typical examples. 
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lntroduction 
To suggest an option for a new theory of medicine does 
not necessarily mean to invalidate all previous or existing 
ones, since their relationship need not to be exclusivist, 
but may be inclusivist instead. A new theory may just cover 
a broader range of dimensions, leaving the validity of 
models for more limited approaches unimpaired. Even 
though Einstein's theory progressed beyond Newton's 
physics, the latter remained relevant and indispensable up 
to the present. 
First of all we must affirm that modern natural science 
has and will keep its legitimate state as a mighty tool for 
solving problems in many fields and aspects of our Jives. 
We all benefit from scientific progress, from electric light 
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to modern means of transportation and communication. 
And we are aware of the many prestigious discoveries in 
cosmology and atomic physics, through space exploration 
or particle accelerators. The critical point is, however, that 
on closer inspection many achievements and applications 
of modern science turn out to be not only advantageaus 
for humanity, but also involve risks and perils, as, for exam-
ple, with nuclear energy. 
Conventional modern medicine faces the same problem, 
since it relies upon the very same principles and methods 
as neighboring fields of science. Of course it has distin-
guished domains of competence and excellence, for exam-
ple epidemiology, bacteriology, toxicology, etc. It is strong 
and convincing wherever medical problems can be 
approached by way of generalization, quantification, and 
statistical recording. Tothis end, conventional medical sci-
entists confine themselves to the same reductionist method 
as used by physicists or chemists: searching for generally 
accepted natural laws, preferably in terms of causality, 
mechanism, economics, and efficiency. 
They try to explore diseases, effects of medicines, and 
correlations between parts ofthe body, as ifthese were neu-
tral objects or entities, existing independently of a particular 
context. Ensnared by spectacular successes in controlling 
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and commanding life-threatening conditions of the organ-
ism and in measuring and manipulating ever smaller struc-
tures and functions of cells, genes, and molecules, indeed 
most scientists, technology writers, and lay persons today 
are highly tempted to conclude that probably everything 
in medicine can be explored in such a manner- if not right 
away, then at least some day in the future. 
Conventional medical science 
This widespread attitude of positivism of science, can 
however be challenged in the field of medicine in a multi-
tude of ways andin fact proves tobe untenable, if examined 
systematically. With the exception of some diseases which 
can be treated effectively or have been eradicated or whose 
incidence has greatly declined, many human complaints, 
especially chronic ailments, can only be palliated, not 
cured. While for the former the conventional biomedical 
paradigm is sufficient and adequate, successful treatment 
of the latter, if possible at all, may need not only more re-
search within customary paths, but new concepts and ap-
proaches based on different principles. For the healing of 
illnesses not satisfactorily managed by conventional med-
icine, the following refl.ections and suggestions might be 
useful. 
Putting the criticisms and objections of the redactionist 
approach in a nutshell, we might say, modern science suffers 
from amnesia of its own genesis, an unawareness of its blind 
spot, or an illusion of its autonomy. Scientists are prone to 
forget that what they are doing is much more than just re-
cording measured data. This can be, and is done, by robots 
and computers as weil. Yet science is a human activity 
which presupposes human subjects, who are never confined 
to passive absorption and adaptation to allegedly objective 
external conditions, but are always also constructing andin-
terpreting the world around themselves. Conducting sci-
ence, therefore, is not a neutral innocuous undertaking, 
but inevitably has practical and ethical implications. 1 
Philosophically speaking, human knowledge is always 
reliant on underlying notions, concepts, and paradigms, 
which are brought into play by human minds. But at the 
same time human knowledge is always in danger of being 
misled, distorted, or adulterated by the notions, concepts, 
and paradigms employed. Science, especially modern sci-
ence which emerged some 300 years ago and has domi-
nated conventional medicine for 150 years, traditionally 
fixates on a canon of methodological rules and laws. Rather 
than constantly considering their scope and Iimits, modern 
medicine tries to explain as much as possible by means of 
reduction, subsumption, and generalization. 
On the other hand, philosophy, poetry, and art, as weil as 
history and theory of science attempt to rebuff, oppose, and 
disapprove the superiority and exclusiveness of predomi-
nant paradigms and mindsets. They usually try to open 
up new spaces, create new categories, or claim new liberties 
to enable the appearance of phenomena which otherwise 
would not emerge on the horizon and become visible or 
perceptible at all. 
Homeopathy 
The topic of amnesia of its own genesis on the part of 
modern science is not a merely theoretical issue, but is of 
crucial practical relevance. This shortcoming is the origin 
of many of the problems medicine is facing at present. 
Modern natural scientists who, for example, are trying to 
explore the memory of human body and soul, are bound 
by the scientific method to Iook for putative objective enti-
ties, such as biomolecular engrams, chemical transmitter 
substances, neuronal flows, brain structures, or the like. 
They take a distant Iook at someone else's body. Butthis 
is an exoteric view, from outside, the attitude of an alleg-
edly neutral observer on an allegedly separate object.2 
The inner dimension of what we call memory, its function, 
meaning, and dynamics, however, cannot be said to be un-
derstood by merely enumerating its necessary physical and 
chemical conditions. At this point, the category of subjec-
tivity, long-neglected by scientific medicine, claims its 
legitimate constitutional place in medical theory. 
lntroducing the subject into medicine 
During the last century, significant attempts have been 
made to (re)introduce the 'subject' into biology and medi-
cine:'.4 So far, however, there is no evidence that this 
project has unsettled the conventional model of 
mainstream medicine to any considerable extent. 
Certainly, (re)introducing the 'subject' into medicine 
never meant just adding another term to a traditional set 
of tools and concepts, but rather a paradigmatic change, 
that is to say, a deconstruction and reconstruction of the 
fundamental scientific framework. 
For centuries, in the wake of Descartes' definition of an-
imals as automats5 and De La Mettrie's reification of hu-
man beings as machines,6 even the so-called life sciences 
applied the same criteria of scientific research as physicists 
or chemists. The latter, however, are dealing with dead 
objects, such as masses, forces, pressures, etc., while the 
former ought to consider the phenomena of the living. Gen-
erally speaking, every branch of scientists tried to reduce 
the whole world, the animated as weil as the inanimate, 
to mechanical, physical, chemical, mathematical, or statis-
tical laws and causal connections. This had, and still has, 
a tremendous impact on modern medicine, on our concept 
of the human being, and on homeopathy. 
The ordinary view of man today is determined by the 
way conventional scientific medicine examines his parts 
and functions. Accordingly, human beings are deemed to 
be complicated mechanisms, health is deemed to be their 
regular and efficient function, and disease is deemed to 
be their failure, that can be objectified by measured values. 
As a corollary of the scientific method, drug effects are 
deemed tobe causal impacts on the body, such as chemical 
reaction, physical suppression, or material Substitution. To 
come to the point, in the conventional scientific approach 
no difference is made in principle between the causality 
of drug action in vitro andin vivo. The substance is deemed 
to execute its determined effect with or without the subject 
of the patient. 
Taking this setting of coordinates and variables as a basis 
for the assessment of any kind of medicine, it is clear what, 
for example, homeopathy will Iook like. According to 
evidence-based medicine, the currently dominant tool 
to implement modern sdentific standards in medicine at 
!arge, homeopathy as a rule does not fulfill the criteria of 
biomedical technologies which can be standardised, quan-
tified, and statistically determined.7 In a na'ive analysis, this 
verdict by leading medical authorities sounds to the general 
public as if homeopathy had proven nottobe sdentific at 
all. 8 In reality, it discloses only the incompatibility of the 
conventional sdentific method and the practice or art of 
homeopathy. This, may in turn be interpreted as evidence 
of failure of the conventional biomedical paradigm rather 
than a disproof of the homeopathic method of healing. 
The cha11enge for homeopaths, therefore, is rather to find 
and establish their own scientific theory than to adapt and 
comply with external standards of conventional medicine. 
Moreover, the challenge for medicine at !arge would be to 
develop a theory of medicine which is wide enough to ex-
plain both what conventional and what homeopathic doctors 
are doing. To be sure, both schools of medicine treat living 
beings. Hence, any theory that does not imply specific phe-
nomena of the living, such as subjectivity, relationships, 
and communication, is doomed to fall far short of reallife. 
The biopsychosocial model of the 
humanbeing 
In search of a theory of medicine which is comprehen-
sive enough to also provide a conceptual framework for 
homeopathy, a valuable key may be found in the work of 
the German physician of Baltic origin Thure von Uexküll 
( 1908-2004 ), in the 20th century one of the protagonists 
of the attempt to introduce the 'subject' into medical 
theory. 9 From the 1950s, Uexküll distinguished hirnself 
as one of the founders of psychosomatic medicine in 
Germany, developing and elaborating the so-called biopsy-
chosocial model of human beings, as suggested by George 
L. Engel. 10•11 His basic idea and vision were to establish a 
scientific model of the human being which on the one hand 
overcomes the reductionism, mechanism, and materialism 
of the conventional sdentific method and on the other 
enables us to understand the human being as a unity in 
various aspects: a unity of different Ievels of existence, 
such as vegetative, animal, and mental functions, but 
also a unity between organism and environment, in short 
between subject and object. 12•13 Particularly, humans 
were seen and treated as living beings that answer to 
signs and do not react to causes. 
In conventional sdence, neither physiologists, psycholo-
gists, nor sociologists consider the entire human being, but 
instead each exclusively applies the method, concepts, and 
paradigms of his spedfic field, thus observing different 
things and talking a different language to that of his col-
leagues. Contrary to that, Uexküll tried to base his theory 
on categories broad enough tobe applied to all ofthe differ-
ent layers, dimensions, and relationships of the patient. To 
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this end, he utilised cybernetic, semiotic, and constructivistic 
concepts of systems theory. These approaches were devel-
oped in control engineering, 14· 15 linguistics, 16 philosophy, 17 
and psychology, 18 but not yet introduced into medicine. 
Preliminary work, upon which Thure von Uexküll drew 
heavily, had been done by his father, Jakob von Uexküll 
(1864-1944), a German-Baltic zoologist and pioneer of 
theoretic biology. 19 Born in Estonia, he went to school 
in Reval (Tallinn), and graduated from the University of 
Dorpat (Tartu) in 1890. Inspired by his studies of Imman-
uel Kant (1724-1804) and German and Baltic romantic 
naturalists, like Johannes Müller (1801-1858) und Kar! 
Ernst von Baer (1792-1876), at the beginning of the 
20th century he conceded a subjective dimension to ani-
mals, considering them as organisms answering to signs 
rather than merely reacting to causes, actually performing 
'functional cycles' (1921) within their 'specific environ-
ments'. In that way he challenged the traditional Supposi-
tion of an alleged objectivity which was said to exist 
independently of particular subjects. 20- 22 
It has recently been suggested that Jakob von Uexküll's 
literary legacy might not be free of racism and anti-Semi-
tism.23 In fact his published work contains no explicit 
anti-Semitic statements. His (unpublished) correspondence, 
however, does contain some such references but these 
are virtually confined to a few letters to Houston Steward 
Chamberlain ( 1855-1927) during the years 1920-1922, 
when - caught in an existential (political, sodal, economic, 
and professional) crisis- he believed the notorious anti-Se-
mitic forgery 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion' tobe 
genuine?4- 26 His few relevant comments on this issue 
give evidence of his fear of an abstract conspiracy, but 
never of any consideration of concrete aggression toward 
individuals. In his important book 'State biology', 
published in 1920 and 1933, he stressed that 'all human 
groups must be respected in their distinctiveness'. 27 Aside 
from cultivating Jewish friendships throughout his life 
(Beer, Cohnheim, Rothschild, Gross, Trebitsch)28·29 and 
having a Jewish mother-in-law,-'0 Uexküll - unlike most 
of his colleagues - tried to prevent the dismissal of Jewish 
professors from German universities in 1933,31 argued pub-
licly against racial anti-Semitism in 1936 and 1939,32 never 
joined the National Socialist party33 or any anti-Semitic Or-
ganisation (on the contrary, left the German Noble Society 
because it fell in line with National Sodalist racism and 
anti-Semitism in 1933)?4 was never involved in human ex-
periments,35 and during World War II went into exile on the 
island of Capri, from 1940 till his death in 1944.36 Rather 
than being a proto-Nazi as has been suggested, Jakob von 
Uexküll cautiously but successfully tried to distinguish 
and prevent his biological theory from instrumentalisation 
of any kind: by vitalist, mechanistic, and social Darwinist 
ideologies as well as by National Sodalist politics. Com-
pared to his contemporaries, his contribution to the history 
of science may be considered one of the most relevant up 
to the present: as a forerunner or reference point of sociobi-
ology, cybernetics, biosemiotics, theoretical biology, behav-
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His son, Thure von Uexküll, was no Nazi either, on 
the contrary he was one of the first German physicians 
who after 1945 openly criticised medical wrongdoing dur-
ing the National Socialist period, as well as the dangerous 
soullessness of mechanistic medical concepts. 38•39 His 
grandson (Thure's nephew), Jakob von Uexküll Jr., a 1944 
born Swedish-German journalist, in 1980 founded the 
Right Livelihood Award,40 which in 1996 was awarded to 
George Vithoulkas - another proof of mental connection 
between the Uexküll family and homeopathy. 
Long before modern constructivists and neuroscientists 
Started to claim that what we call reality is an image, 
idea, or illusion rather than an objective invariable world 
which would be one and the same for everybody,41 - 44 
Jakob von Uexküll sr. came to similar conclusions by 
means of his experiments with sea urchins and other 
marine and terrestrial animals. He demonstrated in an 
impressive way that every living being constructs and 
therefore has and commands its own subjective 
environment. How for example the environment feels or 
Iooks to a tick (lxodida) can be deduced from its sensory 
and motor organs. The tick can only perceive and react to 
the sensual qualities of warm or cold, up or down, and, 
the presence or absence of butyric acid. Accordingly, 
only such information has a meaning for the tick, while 
anything eise is meaningless, not perceived at all, and 
thus, never becomes part of its subjective environment.'"'5 
Apparently, different animals attach different impor-
tance to phenomena that they perceive. But even the 
same individual may attach great importance to something 
only for a limited time, while at another time the same 
thing is considered tobe unimportant. This difference in as-
sessment depends upon the animal 's inner state. When hun-
gry, potential foodstuff gains the highest meaning within 
the perceptible world. When looking for a sexual partner, 
however, the perception focuses on different things, thus 
forming another subjective environment, as Jong as this 
preference lasts. The difficult point to understand here is 
that nobody can really know about anything like a neutral 
objective reality in which all animals would live and inter-
act. Instead, each one is living in its own subjective envi-
ronment, which is the result of a permanent construction 
process, depending on one's own prevailing inner state. 
The basic unit ofliving, therefore, may be conceptualised 
as a 'functional cycle', consisting of a sensory and a motor 
branch, with a circular semiotic process. According to its 
needs, the organism perceives signs from his environment 
to which he attaches a meaning and reacts in a way that af-
fects and alters these signs, so that their meaning and thus 
the organism's environment change. Contrary and comple-
mentary to conventional causal-mechanic explanations, 
this new approach to understanding the interactions be-
tween animals and their specific environments is based on 
the concept of subjectivity. Hence, it is hermeneutic rather 
than deterrninistic. 
Thure von Uexküll, carrying on his father's innovative 
approach toward a scientific comprehension of the living, 
elaborated this basic model of a 'functional cycle' for the 
setting of human beings and supplemented it with the con-
Homeopathy 
cept of a 'situational cycle'. Apart from an increasing com-
plexity regarding additional psychic and social Ievels, as 
a major distinction of the human condition, he considered 
the possibility of the human mind, instead of directly re-
sponding to perceived signs, imagining a situation and re-
hearsing it mentally, without running a risk. To describe 
this specific human option in terms of systems theory, he 
coined the concept of a 'situational cycle'. 
The real strength of the biopsychosocial model of the hu-
man being, however, - apart from considering humans as 
organisms that answer to signs rather than react to causes -
lies in the capability to overcome the theoretical as weil as 
institutional separation of physiological, psychical, and 
social problems of a patient. No matter which Ievel of ex-
istence one is considering, be it biological cell function, in-
teraction of organs, psychic communication, or social 
relationships, the semiotic model of attaching, processing, 
and transforming meaning of perceived signs and thus con-
tinuously reconstructing one's subjective environment, 
proves to be applicable in all cases. Since each cell, organ, 
organism, etc. has its own environment, its own order of 
importance, and its own code to detect and process mean-
ingful signs, interactions between different systems or 
layers have to be interpreted as translation processes 
(from one system of codes to another) rather than causal-
mechanic effects, which in the psychological and social di-
mension have no explanatory power, anyway. 
The consequence of this model of semiotic and cyber-
netic processes underlying the permanent reconstruction 
of our environment is that everybody is living in his own 
individual reality. Construction of a common reality is pos-
sible (e.g. between doctor and patient), but needs extra 
communication and translation of signs between the indi-
viduals and their subjective environments. To make things 
more complicated, each unit of a subject and environment 
also has its individual history, starting at the point in early 
infancy where the basic unity had separated for the first 
time, where both subject and object came into being, 
ernerging out of non-existence, and came into the world. 
Tracing back the development of the self, its senses, its first 
impressions, feelings, and conceptions, to the point where the 
systemic processes described in the biopsychosocial model 
were not yet running, but still had to be created and initiated, 
Uexküll uses the German term 'Stimmung' in order to char-
acterise this original state at the fringe of scientific language 
and notions.46 This notion cannot easily be translated into one 
single English word, due to its many facets, such as mood, 
atmosphere, general feeling, sentiment, tone, or tuning. 
Thus, a kind of tuning would be the precursor of any unit 
of communication, as the minimal form ofbeing. Later, by 
means of socialization of the new born child, this pre-
verbal experience will gradually be translated and trans-
formed from a vegetative, to animal, and human Ievel, 
when strategies and programs of perception and activities 
are generated to solve problems. 
Conversely, even in adulthood any biopsychosocial state 
or conftict will always be constituted by a reproduction and 
realization of this original individual 'Stimmung' and its 
destiny within the biography of the patient. 
The relevance for homeopathy 
This wording, which in other respects is not customary 
in conventional hard-core science, may remind the reader 
ofthe well-known definition of disease which Samuel Hah-
nemann (1755-1843) some 200 years ago had introduced 
while attempting to provide a tentative theory of his new 
science and art of healing. Disease, he said, is a detuning 
or derangement ('Verstimmung') of the life-force, using 
the root of the same German term 'Stimmung'. Accord-
ingly, healing would be the retuning of the detuned life-
f . . . . l f t . 47 48 orce mto 1ts ongma state o unmg. · 
When Hahnemanntried to explain to his contemporaries 
in theoretical terms what he had found and what he was do-
ing in practice, the medical theory of histime was justabout 
to abandon traditional notions and concepts, such as semi-
ology,49 teleology,50 and vitalism, and to embrace modern 
ideas and programs, such as causality, mechanism, and ma-
terialism. Hahnemann, living and operating at the interface 
of two epochs, availed hirnself of heterogenous compo-
nents of medical theory in order to connect to the scientific 
discourse of that transitional period. This is why some of 
Hahnemann's conceptions today seem antiquated and out-
dated, some modern and progressive, and some postmod-
. . II l"d "1 em, revolutwnary, or even perenma y va 1 .-
Homeopathy at !arge, however, is stillieft wanting a con-
sistent and conclusive theory. In fact, due to the Iack of 
awareness of its theoretical roots, homeopaths easily tend 
to capitulate when exposed to criticism and try to comply 
with the demands of what they think is current scientific 
standard. Traditionally, they are used to think that causes 
are the most important issue in medical treatment. 52 To pre-
vent being alienated from one's own practical experience 
by inadequate theoretical objections, however, a good un-
derstanding of the strength and weakness of the respective 
theory is required. With the biopsychosocial model of the 
human being today most of the refutations on the part of 
conventional scientific medicine may be rebutted. That 
way, a new self-confidence could arise amongst homeo-
paths whenever they become aware that what they are do-
ing in practice is in full accordance with the most coherent, 
significant, and up-to-date model of medicine. 53 
As Iong as one clings to the conceptual framework of 
conventional medicine, it is virtually impossible to make 
sense of most of the traditional homeopathic terms and 
concepts, such as life-force, detuning, dynamic action, se-
miology, idiosyncrasy, etc. However, since they can be 
translated into the language of the biopsychosocial model 
and understood and verified within its framework, the prob-
lern lies more on the side of conventional medical theory 
than on that of the homeopathic method and practice. 
In order to prevent misunderstanding and misinterpreta-
tion, homeopaths would be weil advised to avoid Hahne-
mann's misleading terms and substitute them by 
theoretically consistent expressions. 
Developing a new theory of homeopathy 
Some examples may illustrate the potential of the bio-
psycho-social model for a new theory of homeopathy. 
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• Terms and concepts such as life-force, life-principle, or 
vital force are incompatible with the methodological re-
duction of conventional medicine based on mechanism, 
materialism, and positivism. In the biopsychosocial 
model, however, there is no problern in admitting vitality 
as a constitutive dimension of all living phenomena. In 
fact, its entire theory is based on it. But for theoretical 
reasons, it is much better to call it intentionality or 'sub-
jectivity'. Conceptualised as autopoietic program of con-
trolloops or redefinedas an emergent property of a living 
system, this term can be more easily connected to other 
sciences.54 lf reinterpreted from a systems theoretical 
and semiotic perspective, in fact, Hahnemann's basic 
idea actually Iooks quite modern. 
• Individual differences in the susceptibility, constitution, 
and disposition of patients are a fundamental problern 
for conventional medicine, whose major methodological 
tests are based on comparison of means tests against the 
background of the cause-effect-impact paradigm. The 
fact that human individuals, according to their present 
state and personal history, respond differently to one 
and the same substance, however, is entirely compatible 
with the biopsychosocial model with its basic semiotic 
process of 'functional cycles'. According to one's inner 
state (including the memory of past stages of individual 
development), a patient may at one moment attach high 
significance to one particular remedy, while at another 
time, according to his changed state, attaches highest im-
portance to another. A Staphysagria state may not last for-
ever, but might change to a Pulsatilla state, for example. 
• While in this case conventional science would focus ei-
ther on supposed causal effects on the Ievel of molecular 
biology or jump to psycho-social imputations, such as 
hypochondriasis, auto-suggestion, or placebo-effect; in 
the biopsychosocial model the patient is considered as 
an integral unit and his reaction toward a remedy is un-
derstood in a uniform (semiotic and cybernetic) way, 
covering all his layers of existence simultaneously. Con-
trary to the conventional paradigm, according to which 
without material substance no drug effect would be pos-
sible, in the biopsychosocial model even the controversy 
about ultramolecular dilutions is irrelevant. lts starring 
point is not a putatively objective world of matter, but 
the subjectivity of the patient who attributes and pro-
cesses subjective meaning to whatever phenomena he 
likes or needs, be it material or immaterial information. 
Not the remedy acts, but the patient! And anyway, he at 
least has to be accepted as real. 
• To make this last point clear, the terminology of medici-
nal 'potencies', pathogenic 'agents', or morbific 'influ-
ences' is highly misleading. lt rests on the conventional 
materialistic assumption (from which Hahnemann could 
not disengage hirnself completely), that external entities 
have causal effects on the patient. Except for overwhelm-
ing physical or chemical impacts, as by mechanical vio-
lence or high doses of suppressive drugs, in regulatory 
therapies without the subject of the patient remedies 
would not be involved in the 'functional cycles' which 




The biopsychosocial model 
JM Schmidt 
patient. Strictly speaking, the germ is not the protagonist, 
but the individual subject is the 'agent' who falls ill when 
exposed to certain things that he associates with morbid-
ity. 1t is not the remedy that causes the eure, but the indi-
vidual subject has the potential to react to particular 
perceptions and meanings of drugs by way of aggrava-
tion, amelioration, or healing. 
• Although Hahnemann did use these conventional terms, 
which obscure rather than elucidate his truly semiotic 
phenomenological approach, on the other hand he repeat-
edly emphasised the 'dynamic' or 'spirit-like' interaction 
between patient, pathogen, and remedy. Although 
his concept of 'dynamic' was vague and blurred, it 
was absolutely clear to him that homeopathic healing 
transcends the categories of conventional physical, 
chemical, mechanical, material, or atomistic thinking.55 
All the more today's homeopaths should not relapse 
and waste resources in arguing against conventional 
causal-mechanical objections and concerns. In spite of 
its complexity, the dynamics of the semiotic processes 
underlying drug proving and the art of healing are per-
fectly represented in the biopsychosocial model. 
• To give an example from reallife: If a particular individ-
ual feels sick after looking at a certain picture, it is not 
a causal effect of the picture that could be reproduced 
in double-blind studies or the like, but the individual sen-
sitivity, disposition, history, etc. of the patient and his par-
ticular dynamics of attaching and processing meaning to 
the phenomena he encounters, that tips the scale. Interest-
ingly, Hahnemann literally speaks of 'psychic organs' ,56 
indicating that he consciously used the same terms and 
concepts to explain dynamic action on the physical as 
weil as on the psychic Ievel. For conventional medical 
theory this mix of notions and Ievels might be a nuisance. 
In the biopsychosocial model, however, it is understood 
in principle that the dynamics of the subject are the 
same on all Ievels and in all dimensions. 
• For Hahnemann the aim of the homeopathic treatment 
was to restore the patient's health, more precisely, to re-
store him to the original state in which he was in his 
healthy days. Importantly, Hahnemann did not mind 
whether the recovered patient became mild or rough 
again, good or bad, bashful or shameless, etc.57 Contrary 
to conventional academic science whose traditional job 
has always been to establish generaily valid criteria and 
rules to impose on everything and everybody, Hahne-
mann's appreciation of the irreducible individuality of 
the patient's identity makes him a forerunner of the bio-
psycho-social model. Ahead of his time, rather than pro-
posing abstract normative ideas of health or the like, 
Hahnemann was aware that each subject has an individual 
kerne! or tuning which cannot be changed by therapeutic 
means. 
• The biopsychosocial model explains why and how every 
individual, together with his subjective environment, 
emerges from a basic tuning ('Stimmung') in early in-
fancy, which in turn will accompany the person in any 
subsequent state experienced throughout his life. Regard-
less whether the nascent being originally feit frightened, 
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relaxed, curious, greedy, etc., as long as the adult man-
ages to keep his genuine subjective environment coher-
ent, he is healthy. Every subject will forever try to 
harmonise ('abstimmen') his first imprinted state with 
the situations and phenomena with which he will interact 
in his later life. Disability to adjust and match one's own 
individual tuning and one's subjective environment, 
would result in disease. If we translate Hahnemann's 
awkward notion 'life-force' into the dynamics of func-
tional and situational cycles connecting the subject with 
his environment, we find his basic concept expressed in 
updated scientific language. 
• Finally, major theoretical positions of Hahnemann, like his 
teleological, deistic, and semiotic reasoning, will remain 
incomprehensible as long as they are assessed from the 
view of conventional scientific thinking. From the per-
spective of the biopsychosocial model, however, it does 
make sense when Hahnemann maintains that the only sci-
entific approach to the patient's state is through the physi-
cian's perception of his signs and symptoms. Also his 
painstaking practical directions concerning drug proving, 
case taking, and follow-up can hardly be appreciated 
against the background of conventional medicine, which 
for intrinsic reasons would willingly confer this Iabor on 
questionnaires, checklists, and computers. With the bio-
psycho-social model, however, it can be understood and 
demonstrated, that semiotic cycles are omnipresent and 
that doctors have tobe aware of them, in their empathic re-
lationship to patients as weil as when watehing the interac-
tion between human beings and the remedy they require. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this account of how the biopsychosocial 
model of the human being could boost homeopathy's 
long-neglected task of developing a new scientific theory, 
it may be remernbered that theory is not just theory and 
practice is not just practice. Without always considering 
the other as weiland being aware ofthe basic unity and dy-
namic connection of all dualities, as the biopsychosocial 
model suggests, we would never understand in scientific 
terms the fundamental interplay between theory and prac-
tice, between subjects and their environment, or between 
the patient and the remedy. Hahnemann obviously under-
stood these things in his heart. 
Nevertheless, the theory ofhomeopathy still Iacks coher-
ence ('Stimmigkeit') and conclusiveness. lt consists of 
a wide range of different concepts and contains compo-
nents of contradictory paradigms. What homeopathy needs 
is a revision of its theoretical armamentarium, in order to 
meet the demands of the day, to be able to present itself 
as a legitimate science, connecting and communicating 
with neighboring fields of science.5s.s9 As the history of 
medicine shows, theoretical consistency, plausibility, and 
persuasiveness are the basis for social, political, and 
institutional recognition. 60 As outlined, these aims might 
be achieved by adopting the biopsychosocial model of 
the human being as a conceptual framework for a new the-
ory of homeopathy. 
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